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Negotiations among lawmakers in the first session of the 105th
Congress resulted in no legislation amending or reauthorizing the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).1  CERCLA authorizes the federal
government to respond to hazardous substance emergencies and to
protect the public health and welfare and the environment.2  But in
recent years considerable criticism has been levied against CERCLA.
Various industry groups, lenders, environmental groups, and legisla-
tors have expressed dissatisfaction with how the current law ad-
dresses a number of controversial issues.3  The main point of conten-
tion has been the reliance on the “polluter pays” principle in
CERCLA, 4 which assigns liability to actual polluters in cleaning up
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1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
2. See CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994).  The response must be consistent with
the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (codified at 40
C.F.R. § 300.1-.1105 (1997)).  Id. § 9604(a).  Additionally, section 105(a) of CERCLA called
for the revision and republication of the NCP.  CERCLA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1994).
As a necessary measure to protect the public health or welfare or the environment, section
104(a)(1)(B) of CERCLA requires the President “to remove or arrange for the removal of, and
provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at
any time (including its removal from any contaminated natural resource), or take any other
response measure consistent with the national contingency plan.”  CERCLA 104(a)(1)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(B) (1994).
3. See KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS:
WHO PAYS AND HOW? 1 (1995)
4. See Richard L. Stroup, Superfund: The Shortcut that Failed, in BREAKING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK 115, 121 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1997); See also PROBST
ET AL., supra note 3, at 65.
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the nation’s hazardous waste sites5 while partly funding cleanups with
a hazardous waste trust fund.  Specifically, the liability approach
found in the current  CERCLA program has caused delays in cleanup
and has generated excessive transaction costs.6  Criticism has also fo-
cused on the possibility that the Superfund program provides incen-
tives to private parties “to spend more money litigating than cleaning
up waste sites.”7  The authority to appropriate money from the Haz-
ardous Substance Superfund (also referred to as the Superfund) ex-
pired on September 30, 19948 and taxing authority expired on De-
cember 31, 1995,9 prompting the current push for reauthorization.
This paper examines CERCLA’s legislative background and the
Clinton Administration’s principles for Superfund legislative reform
introduced in the first session of the 105th Congress, and provides an
economic analysis of those proposed reform principles generating the
most criticism and attention, namely the assignment of liability
shares, transaction and cleanup costs, natural resource damages
(NRD), and brownfield redevelopment.  Finally, this paper com-
ments on whether the reform principles espoused by the Clinton
Administration will likely lead to an improved Superfund system.
Legislative reforms that will, among other things, lower transaction
costs, discourage excessive NRD claims, and seek cost-effective re-
medial actions will make Superfund a more effective program.  Effec-
tive reform principles must give more attention to the likely behav-
ioral response of affected parties to prevent unintended
consequences of well-intended policies.
I.  BACKGROUND
A.  Purpose
The primary purpose of CERCLA is to authorize the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to respond to hazardous sub-
stance emergencies and to protect public health, welfare and the en-
5. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
6. See LLOYD S. DIXON, RAND INSTITUTE, FIXING SUPERFUND: THE EFFECT OF THE
PROPOSED SUPERFUND REFORM ACT OF 1994 ON TRANSACTION COSTS 1 (1994).
7. JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, RAND INSTITUTE, SUPERFUND AND
TRANSACTION COSTS: THE EXPERIENCES OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS
1 (1992).
8. See CERCLA § 111 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1994).
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 4611(e)(2) (1994).
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vironment by cleaning up the country’s worst hazardous waste sites. 10
Two financial mechanisms drive hazardous waste site cleanups.  First,
liability incentives, through a broad category of responsible parties,
take advantage of the “polluter pays” principle.11  In this manner, the
law seeks to make those responsible for the improper disposal of
hazardous waste bear the costs and accept responsibility for their ac-
tions.  Second, a trust fund (Hazardous Substance Superfund or the
Superfund)12 financed through excise taxes on chemicals,13 petro-
leum,14 and corporate environmental income taxes15 helps achieve the
goal of expeditious site cleanups.
The Superfund can be used to fund cleanup at sites that require
immediate remedial attention before the U.S. Department of Justice
has an opportunity to seek reimbursement from responsible parties.16
The law was designed in this fashion so cleanup could be imple-
mented quickly and litigation over the extent of responsibility would
only take place after remedial action.17
10. The President, by Executive Order, delegated EPA with the responsibility of amend-
ing the NCP.  Exec. Order No. 12777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54757 (1991).
11. Section 107(a) of CERCLA holds liable the following parties:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
12. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994) (creating the Hazardous Substance Superfund).
13. See id. § 4661.
14. See id. § 4611.
15. See id. § 59A.
16. See CERCLA § 111(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(3) (1994).  The Attorney General may
commence an action on behalf of the Fund to recover any compensation paid by the Fund to
any claimant.  CERCLA § 112(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(c)(3) (1994).
17. For the definition of “remedial action” see CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)
(1994).
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B.  Legislative History
Driven largely in response to the Love Canal incident, CERCLA
was enacted in 1980 during the final month of the Carter administra-
tion, and was designed to result in the decontamination and remedia-
tion of hazardous waste sites within the United States.  Love Canal
began in the late 1970’s when it was discovered that homes in Niagara
Falls, New York had become contaminated due to Hooker Chemi-
cal’s dumping of over 21,000 tons of chemicals, including dioxin, into
an excavated canal three decades earlier.18  Public outrage from the
Love Canal incident eventually led to the passage of CERCLA and
creation of the Superfund.19
CERCLA was to be a short-lived program intended to clean up
the nation’s most dangerous waste sites, such as Love Canal.  The
program was to cost less than $2 billion and was to be paid for by
those parties mainly responsible for the pollution.  The program was
designed primarily to identify and cleanup hazardous waste sites
throughout the United States, and assign the costs of cleanup directly
to those parties responsible for the contamination at the site.20
CERCLA was reauthorized and amended in 1986 by the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 21  SARA
made significant changes to the size of the Hazardous Substances Su-
perfund and the sources of the revenues that replenish it, as well as to
the statutory criteria for selecting remedies at sites.22  SARA also
codified the use of EPA-developed tools designed to provide incen-
tives for responsible parties to reach settlement agreements with the
government regarding the conduct of cleanups and contributions to
the cost of cleanups.23  The main goal of these changes is to speed set-
tlements and reduce transaction costs.
SARA amendments authorize EPA to release de minimis par-
ties from liability.24  De minimis parties are parties found to be re-
sponsible for only a small percentage of the volume and toxicity of
18. See STROUP, supra note 4, at 115-20.
19. See id.
20. See PROBST  ET AL., supra note 3, at 12.
21. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1994)).
22. See PROBST ET AL., supra note 3, at 14.  From 1981-1993, cumulative trust fund reve-
nues were provided by the following sources: petroleum tax, 28%; environmental tax, 22%;
chemical tax, 19%; general revenues, 13%; interest, 8%; advances, 5%; and cost recoveries,
5%.  See id. at 15.
23. See SARA § 122, 100 Stat. 1613, 1678-88 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1994)).
24. See id. § 122(g)(1), 100 Stat. at 1685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (1994)).
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the hazardous substances at a hazardous waste site.  SARA also per-
mits the government to “mix fund” at certain sites.  Mixed funding
allows the government to assume some portion of the cleanup ex-
penses, with responsible parties assuming the remainder of the
costs.25  Finally, SARA establishes time schedules for EPA to start
site studies and cleanup activities in an attempt to accelerate the pace
of cleanups.26
Due to legislators’ fears that any CERCLA reauthorization
process would be contentious and lengthy, 27  CERCLA was extended
in 1990 as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.28  The
1990 changes extended the taxing and funding authority of CERCLA
for three years (1991-1994).29  Under most environmental statutes, a
lapsed authorization does not impact the government’s ability to im-
plement programs.30  For the case of CERCLA, however, the EPA
has to take steps to shut down the Superfund program if the financial
resources are unavailable.31  This feature of the Superfund program
gives the reauthorization and amendment process an enhanced sense
of urgency.
C.  Why does the current law need reform?
Due to the high costs32 and  long time horizons involved in
cleaning up hazardous waste sites33 and with litigation plaguing the
program, observers note that reform is needed in the Superfund pro-
gram.34  In response to these concerns, EPA has adopted many ad-
25. See id. § 122(b)(1), 100 Stat. at 1679 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1)) (providing for
the reimbursement of responsible parties from the Fund “for certain costs of actions that the
parties have agreed to perform but which the President has agreed to finance”).
26. See id. § 116, 100 Stat. at 1653-54 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9616 (1994)).
27. See PROBST ET AL., supra note 3, at 13;
28 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-319 (1990).
29. See id. at 1388-319
30. See PROBST ET AL., supra note 3, at 13.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., RCED 96-125, BARRIERS TO BROWNFIELD RE-
DEVELOPMENT 3 (1996) (stating that EPA and GAO estimate total cleanup costs of about $26
million per site); PROBST ET AL., supra note 3, at 20 (estimating total cleanup costs at $29.1
million).
33. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., RCED 97-20, SUPERFUND: TIMES TO COMPLETE THE
ASSESSMENT AND CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 8 (1997).  Additionally, the aver-
age time that lapsed between a site’s placement on the NPL and completion of cleanup in-
creased from 2.4 years in 1986 to 10.6 years in 1996.  See id. at 5.
34. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & R. B. Stewart, The Superfund Debate, in ANALYZING
SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 3, 13-14 (Richard L. Revesz & R.B. Stewart
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ministrative reforms in the Superfund program over the past several
years.  EPA’s current administrative reforms include setting priorities
for cleanups, clarifying the role of cost in the remedy selection proc-
ess, encouraging brownfields redevelopment, and using more reason-
able assumptions about current and future land use.35  The Superfund
program can benefit from increased efficiency when EPA devises ef-
fective administrative reforms, but if poorly designed, these reforms
can have deleterious effects on the efficiency of the overall Super-
fund program.  EPA’s administrative reforms have been in place for
a short time, and, as such, adequate data does not exist to demon-
strate any degree of effectiveness.  Legislative amendments are ex-
pected to clarify and formalize the role of these administrative re-
forms by devising a more efficient liability allocation and settlement
process, while holding EPA more accountable for the efficiency of
the Superfund program.  In addition, legislative amendments should
include other mechanisms to make remedies more appropriate and
cost effective at each Superfund site.
II.  CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PRINCIPLES
In May 1997, the Clinton Administration introduced a set of
principles to help guide reauthorization negotiations with the 105th
Congress.36  These principles were intended to increase the pace of
cleanups, improve program efficiency, decrease litigation, and reduce
transaction costs, while providing adequate protection of human
health and the environment.  The following discussion provides the
text of those Administration principles generating the most contro-
versy, along with a background of each principle in relation to cur-
rent proposed legislation, and a brief economic analysis of each.
A.  Liability and Enforcement
     Maintain the principle that those who are responsible for
the contamination must pay for the cleanup.
     There should be clearly defined exemptions or limitations
on liability, reflecting EPA’s experience with administrative
                                                                                                                                     
eds., 1995) [hereinafter ANALYZING SUPERFUND]; PROBST ET AL., supra note 3, at 1-2; DIXON,
supra note 6, at 1.
35. See U.S. EPA, Superfund Administrative Reforms: Annual Report Fiscal Year 1996
(last modified Dec. 20, 1996) <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/oerr/admin/execsum.htm>.
36. Clinton Administration’s Superfund Legislative Reform Principles (updated Dec. 1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/superfund/oerr/whatsnew/princple.htm> [hereinafter Administration Prin-
ciples].
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reforms, for very small volume contributors, generators and
transporters of municipal solid waste, and bona fide prospec-
tive purchasers.
     Legislation should establish “orphan share” funding from
a separate account consistent with the President’s Fiscal Year
1998 budget request.  Orphan share compensation, defined as
a contribution for responsibility attributable to insolvent or
defunct parties, must not compete against cleanup dollars or
reduce the funding available for response actions.
     Legislation should reduce transaction costs by promoting
settlements and encouraging contribution allocation of costs
among settling parties through a flexible, nonprescriptive
process that makes effective use of available “orphan share”
funding.
     The Administration strongly opposes, among other pro-
posals: “site liability carve-outs” (i.e., elimination of liability
for persons based upon type of site); limits on the President’s
CERCLA section 106 authority; pre-enforcement judicial re-
view of remedy decisions; repeal of all or part of the current
strict, retroactive, joint and several liability standards; pre-
emption of state liability laws; and changes to the liability sys-
tem that slow cleanups, reduce program efficiency or increase
litigation and transaction costs, or that reduce the possibility
of settlements.
1. Transaction costs associated with assigning liability
BACKGROUND
The “polluter pays” principle in CERCLA allows EPA to force
those parties responsible for contributing to the contamination of a
hazardous waste site to accept financial responsibility and clean up
the site.37  While this notion has been effective in keeping the federal
cost to the Superfund down by minimizing direct government imple-
mentation of cleanups,38 the principle has generated excessive levels
of litigation over the assignment of liability. 39  Further, the liability
scheme in CERCLA has shifted transaction costs of allocating
37. See  STROUP, supra note 4, at 121-22.
38. See PROBST ET AL., supra note 3, at 17.
39. See LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., PRIVATE-SECTOR CLEANUP EXPENDITURES AND
TRANSACTION COSTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SITES 4 (1993).
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cleanup shares to private parties and away from the federal govern-
ment.40  As a result, the private sector bears the burden of the in-
creasingly substantial transaction costs.  Movement away from the
status quo of the current system will impose additional up-front costs
on EPA, which provides little incentive for the agency to eliminate
the principle from the current Superfund law.41
The legal history of the current liability system provides insight
into why critics of the current law continue to push for an overhaul of
how liability is resolved.  The courts have held that under CERCLA
liability is retroactive, strict, and joint and several.42  Joint and several
liability has created the climate that generates costly levels of litiga-
tion among private parties trying to determine allocation of contribu-
tion shares.43  Often, the EPA can determine that a few parties are re-
sponsible for contamination of a particular site and can then force
them to pay for the entire cost of cleanup.  As a consequence, these
parties seek compensation from other responsible parties through
contribution litigation.44  This often causes a firm, forced to pay for
cleanup costs under a theory of joint and several liability, to pursue
contribution from firms that may have played only a minimal role in
40. See id. at 4-7.  The authors note that potentially responsible parties (PRPs) typically
face five main sources of transaction costs: (1) searches for other PRPs, (2) negotiations and
litigation with other PRPs over apportioning costs, (3) defense against cost recovery by EPA
and cost recovery litigation between PRPs, (4) negotiations and litigation with EPA over rem-
edy selection and cleanup implementation, and (5) negotiations and litigation with insurers for
reimbursement of costs.  See id.
41. See Lloyd S. Dixon, The Transaction Costs Generated by Superfund’s Liability Ap-
proach, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 33, at 179.  EPA expenditures on cleanup and
transaction costs amounted to about $9.1 billion through 1991 while private expenditures
through 1991 were about $11 billion.  See id.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1988).  Retro-
active liability applies since the law addresses contamination that was caused by activities tak-
ing place before CERCLA was enacted in 1980.  See id.  Liability is strict because a responsible
party can be found liable even if it was not negligent.  See id.  When the damage at a hazardous
waste site is not divisible, liability is joint and several.  See id.  Under joint and several liability,
the government can hold one or more parties liable for the full costs of the site cleanup, even if
other parties at the site are liable.  See id.
43. See ACTION & DIXON, supra note 7, at 24-25.  Evidence suggests that a substantial
level of transaction costs comes from coverage disputes, or disputes between insurers and those
they insure over who should pay for site cleanups.  See id.
44. One can imagine a large responsible party weighing its litigation costs (often paid by
insurers) associated with nominating additional PRPs against its expected benefit due to de-
creased contribution to cleanup costs as the fixed cleanup costs are allocated among more re-
sponsible parties.  In a worst case scenario, the large responsible party will bear additional legal
fees and delay payment of cleanup costs if no other responsible parties are found.  Note that it
is entirely feasible that this strategy could result in a net benefit for the large responsible party
if its discount rate is high enough.
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the contamination of a particular site.  Many times, a responsible
party lists a large number of businesses in the local phonebook as ad-
ditional potentially responsible parties (PRP’s).  These “phonebook
nominations” can cause excessive litigation as the private parties use
the courts to settle the liability issue.
Experts agree that the average level of transaction costs per Su-
perfund site is too great.45  A 1993 RAND study examines PRP trans-
action costs for 108 private-sector firms with annual revenues less
than $20 billion.46  At 18 Superfund sites from 1981 to 1991, RAND
estimated transaction costs made up 32 percent of total cleanup costs,
averaging $32 million per site (see Table 1).47  For over 50 percent of
those firms with total expenditures greater than $1,000, transaction
costs accounted for more than 60 percent of cleanup costs.48  A 1992
RAND study estimated that for five large industrial firms with aver-
age annual revenues of $70 billion in 1989, transaction costs averaged
21 percent of total cleanup costs.49 (see Table 1).  In addition, the
study examined the total expenditures on hazardous-wastes claims of
four large insurers from 1986 to 1989, and found that an average of 88
percent of expenditures were transactional in nature.50  Finally, a 1994
RAND report uses the results from their previous two studies and es-
timates transaction costs to be 36 percent of total private-sector
cleanup expenditures through 1991.51  Using EPA’s cost estimate of
$26 million per site,52 and a private-sector transaction cost share of 36
percent,53 private party transaction costs total over $9 million at each
Superfund site. The total transaction costs generated by the Super-
fund program would presumably reach even higher with the inclusion
of local, state, and federal government transaction costs.
45. See generally DIXON, supra note 6.
46. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 39, at 54
47. See DIXON, supra note 6, at 5.  A 90% confidence interval around the $10 million es-
timate of transaction costs ranges from $8 million to $14 million per site.  See id.
48. See id., at 54.
49. See ACTON & DIXON, supra note 7, at 35-39.
50. See id. at 23-24.
51. See DIXON, supra note 6, at 5.
52. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 32, at 3; see also PROBST ET AL., supra note 3, at
15 (estimating the cost of cleanup per site at almost $30 million).
53. See DIXON, supra note 6, at 5.
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Table 1:  Private Party Transaction Costs by Firm Size54
1991 annual
revenues
1992 Study
(percent, 1984-1989)
1993 Study
(percent, 1981-1991)
>$20 billion 19 -
$1 to 20 billion - 19
$100 to 1,000 million - 15
$15 to 100 million - 60
<$15 million - 60
ANALYSIS
The Administration wants to maintain the “polluter pays” prin-
ciple, which reduces a firm’s incentive to pollute by forcing firms to
be financially accountable for any pollution they create.  This liability
structure further shifts cleanup and transaction costs away from the
federal government.55  The administration’s persistent support of the
“polluter pays” principle, however, is a burden on the Superfund sys-
tem and on the private sector because of the excessive litigation gen-
erated among private parties.
Superfund pits one firm against another.  This creates an envi-
ronmental conflict in which several players invest effort to win a fixed
reward—the avoided clean-up costs.  The rules of the conflict set the
underlying incentives that can either increase or decrease the transac-
tion costs.  An economics literature has emerged to better under-
stand what rules make people fight harder, and thus increase the
level of transaction costs in Superfund.  A few key insights are worth
keeping in mind as one considers changes in rules to reduce the level
of transaction costs in Superfund.  First, conflicts often involve fights
between unevenly matched firms—a favorite and an underdog.  The
literature has shown that if the underdog commits to its effort first,
transaction costs are less than if the favorite moves first.56  The reason
is that both players find it profitable when the underdog moves first
because he reveals his relative lack of strength, thereby, allowing the
54. See id. at 4.
55. See DIXON ET AL, supra note 39.
56. See Kyung Hwan Baik & Jason F. Shogren, Environmental Conflicts with Reimburse-
ment for Citizen Suits, 27 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 11 (1994).  Formally, the favorite is the
player whose odds of winning exceed 50 percent in the Nash equilibrium of the conflict; the
underdog has odds less than 50 percent.  See id. at 9.  A Nash equilibrium exists when neither
player has a unilateral incentive to change its action.  See id. at 4-5.
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favorite to respond efficiently.  Since the underdog expects the fa-
vorite to react in proportion to his effort, he also reduces his effort.
Consequently, overall transaction costs are lower, and both players
and society gain from having the underdog move first.  For Super-
fund, this implies that rules that allow smaller firms to move first may
result in less transaction costs.
Second, the question of the potential for reimbursement of legal
fees in Superfund conflicts may be an issue.  Currently, most major
federal environmental laws allow for some reimbursement of private
enforcement if the enforcer wins its case.57  The evidence suggests
that private enforcement will increase in importance, and, thus, it is
important to understand the efficiency impacts of reimbursement.
Citizen suits, for example, have increased to 266 in 1986 -- from fewer
than 25 between 1970 and 1978 and only 41 in 1982.58  Private en-
forcement actions have a very high probability of success if they
reach the settlement stage,59 and success virtually guarantees recovery
of attorney’s fees.60  Transaction costs will be influenced by how the
reimbursement rules are defined in a Superfund conflict.  If reim-
bursement is symmetric as in the British rule system (loser pays sys-
tem), then either both parties will generate high transaction costs
trying to win the case, or neither party will enter into the conflict for
fear of spending more fighting than the prize is worth.61 If reim-
bursement is asymmetric, however, and limited to only the private
enforcer or to smaller firms who have been sued as part of a
“phonebook” strategy, transaction costs will be less.62
Reforming the current liability system is needed because of the
perverse incentives and high transaction costs created by the
“polluter pays” principle.  The administration, by strongly favoring
the principle does not advocate alternative tax or liability structures
that could address the incentive and cost problems.  One feasible re-
form is a two-step approach—(1) develop a tax-based system to fund
cleanup of existing waste sites,  and (2) implement a separate liabil-
ity-based system to address current and future pollution concerns.  A
57. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304(d), U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994); Clean Water Act § 505(d),
U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994).
58. See W. Naysnerski & T. Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental
Law, 68 LAND ECON. 28, 35 (1992).
59. See id. at 38.
60. See id. at 32.
61. See Baik & Shogren, supra note 56, at 2-6.
62. See id. at 6-11.  This is the reimbursement system currently used for private enforce-
ment under U.S. environmental laws.  See id. at 2.
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targeted emissions tax63 would allow existing hazardous waste sites to
be cleaned up using revenues generated through a corporate envi-
ronmental tax,  while ignoring the issue of liability altogether.  This
would eliminate the excessive transaction costs associated with ap-
portioning cleanup costs.  Concurrently, a liability based system
would address current and future pollution, providing the incentive
to reduce the benefits to private parties from releasing hazardous
waste.64  But this approach lacks the moral and popular appeal of the
“polluter pays” system because those private parties who created the
hazardous waste sites share financial responsibility for cleaning up a
Superfund site with other firms holding no responsibility for the con-
tamination of a particular site.  Also, any movement away from the
current tax and liability structure may create increased administrative
costs for EPA.  The EPA would now bear the costs of accurately de-
termining all of the responsible parties at current and future hazard-
ous waste sites.  However, finding legislators willing to support a
proposal that puts additional burden on the federal budget may be a
challenge.
2.  Allocation of Liability
BACKGROUND
During the 103rd Congress, a liability allocation process was
proposed in the Superfund Reform Act of 1994 (SRA).65  While SRA
was never passed, the proposed allocation process became the model
for EPA’s ongoing “allocation pilot” program present in the adminis-
trative reform package.  Under what can effectively be characterized
as an alternative dispute resolution technique based on an arbitra-
tion-like process, an “allocator” conducts a non-binding out-of-court
allocation process and assigns shares of liability to responsible parties
based on equitable factors.  Parties may resort to this type of alloca-
tion process only after a negotiation phase fails to produce results.
After receiving a report describing the allocation of liability shares,
EPA then offers to settle with parties for their allocated share and,
also, offers to pay 100 percent of the orphan share.
63. See NICK HANLEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE,
106-29 (1997).
64. Alternatively, a system generating revenues solely through a corporate environmental
tax will result in the lowest level of transaction costs.  However, this approach decreases private
incentives to prevent pollution.
65. H.R. 4916, 103d Cong. §§ 401-414 (1994).
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ANALYSIS
A push towards legislation that would reduce some of the pri-
vate party litigation through de micromis66 and de minimis67 liability
relief is expected to provide greater efficiency in allocating responsi-
bility under CERCLA.  Eliminating those parties that have contrib-
uted very small amounts of pollution and/or are very small them-
selves would likely reduce the pool of PRP’s that could potentially be
pulled into litigation.  This should have the desired effect of reducing
overall transaction costs associated with litigation, which should
boost efficiency.  The allocation process offered in SRA will likely
lead to lower transaction costs due to more efficient allocation of
contribution shares, but is just one of many potential allocation proc-
esses that would be likely to generate lower transaction costs.
All of these potential allocation processes should include key
protocol from a core group of elements capable of impacting the
transaction costs of allocating contribution shares.  Included in this
broad set of elements would be factors such as the inclusion of a neu-
tral, third-party allocator, mandated time frames, and permissibility
of nomination of PRP’s by other responsible parties.  One allocation
process exists that can generate the lowest level of transaction costs
among the entire set of allocation processes.  This allocation process
is economically most desirable and should be considered in the
CERCLA reauthorization and amendment process.  There is no em-
pirical evidence to suggest that EPA’s current allocation pilot pro-
gram is the most efficient allocation process available.  However, the
program is being scrutinized closely in the current reauthorization
and amendment debates.
The allocation pilot has some distinct advantages, most notably
that settlements avoid litigation and are expected to occur in a rela-
tively short period of time and at a lower cost (through reduced
transaction costs) than those settlements achieved under the current
law.  A settlement process that allows an arbitration-like allocation
procedure to act as a backstop to traditional negotiations would pro-
duce more efficient settlements.  The allocation procedure would be
binding on both the responsible parties and EPA and would act as a
mechanism to prevent the settlement process from reaching a litiga-
66. De micromis parties are “truly small contributors to a site.”  Katherine N. Probst,
Evaluating the Impact of Alternative Superfund Financing Schemes, in ANALYZING SU-
PERFUND, supra note 34, at 145, 151.
67. De minimis parties are small contributors at waste sites.  See id. at 151-52; see 42
U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (1994).
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tion phase.  The expected result would be significantly lower transac-
tion costs and increased allocation efficiency.
The reauthorization and amendment process is not moving to-
wards a two-way binding process, but is expected to move towards
the less restrictive one-way binding process (binding only on EPA).
This is because an allocation system that binds a responsible party to
a liability share raises constitutional due process issues.  Such an allo-
cation scheme would not adequately provide an appeals process for
those responsible parties forced by an allocator to pay some fraction
of cleanup costs.  Further, it is unlikely that firms would agree to a
double binding process since these firms would be providing a “blank
check” for the government to clean up hazardous waste sites.68
B.  Remedy
     Remedies must protect human health and the environment
over the long term.
     Ground water should be restored to beneficial uses, wher-
ever practicable.  Maximum Contaminant Levels69 under the
Safe Drinking Water Act or more stringent applicable State
standards should be established as the cleanup standards for
ground water whose beneficial use is or is anticipated to be as
a drinking water source, unless technically impracticable.
     Consideration of reasonably anticipated future land use
should continue to be factored into the remedy selection proc-
ess, based on consultation with the affected community.
     Cleanups should be cost-effective and foster productive re-
use of contaminated property to the degree practicable.
     A preference for treatment of highly toxic, highly mobile
waste should be retained.  The mandate for permanence
should be modified to emphasize long-term protection and
reliability.
68. By moving directly to an arbitration-like process in a double binding setting, PRPs
would no longer have the opportunity to negotiate contribution shares.
69. “Maximum contaminant level” is defined as the “maximum possible level of a con-
taminant in water which is delivered to any user of a public water system.”  42 U.S.C. § 300(f)
(1994).
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     Cleanups should comply with the applicable substantive
requirements of other Federal environmental laws and State
environmental or facility siting laws applicable to remedial
actions.  The requirements to comply with relevant and ap-
propriate requirements should be eliminated.
     The dollar and time limits of Fund-financed removals
should be increased.
     The Administration strongly opposes, among other pro-
posals, the following: prescriptive cost or risk assessment re-
quirements, particularly those that would result in unprotetive
remedies; man-dated remedy updates (including any remedy
reopener provisions); default approval of remedy decisions;
provisions which would fail to discourage contamination of
currently uncontaminated land, ground water, or natural re-
sources; provisions which would inhibit coordination between
cleanup and natural resource restoration; elimination of ap-
plicable requirements from Federal laws or State environ-
mental or facility siting laws; pre-enforcement judicial review
of remedy decisions; and any other changes that disrupt or
slow cleanups or settlements or result in remedies that are in-
adequately protective of human health, welfare, environment
and natural resources.
BACKGROUND
Currently, CERCLA has a preference for cleanups that treat and
permanently remove contamination.  This tends to result in expen-
sive and sometimes unnecessary cleanup procedures, particularly if
restricting certain land uses after cleanup is a viable alternative.70
Historically, EPA has not accounted for the relative risk of sites in
establishing priorities for work.  EPA has consistently failed to allo-
cate cleanup resources to reduce the most significant threats to hu-
man health and the environment and has, instead, tended to allocate
valuable resources to cleanup sites posing small or insignificant risks.
This inability to fund cleanup of high risk “hot spots” often results in
performing many remediations that are not cost-effective.71
Representatives of industry, local governments, state regulatory
agencies, and EPA argue that the appropriate level of cleanup at a
typical Superfund site should be made early in the remedy selection
70. Natural attenuation and institutional controls can result in low cleanup costs at some
hazardous waste sites.
71. Hotspots are defined as those sites that pose serious immediate threats to human
health and the environment.
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process and should be based on the most likely future land use of the
site.72  Many of the problems EPA has experienced with costly reme-
dies are attributable to the lack of an appropriately selected remedy
that is consistent with current and reasonably anticipated future land
uses.73  The Superfund Cleanup Acceleration Act of 1997, S.8, was the
most prominent bill intended to amend and reauthorize CERCLA
introduced in the first session of the 105th Congress.74  Among other
things, S.8 offers liability relief for a broad group of PRP’s,75 provides
limited funding for characterizing, assessing, and remediating brown-
fields,76 and clarifies cleanup standards.77  S.8 includes provisions that
would require EPA to account for actual, planned, or reasonably an-
ticipated future use of the land and water resources.78
ANALYSIS
One important revision that Congress can make through
amending and reauthorizing CERCLA79 is to set cleanup standards
on the basis of an assessment of the activities and future land use
likely to take place at a Superfund site.80  The Idaho Pole site81 in
Bozeman, Montana illustrates what can happen when future land use
is not appropriately considered when selecting a remedial action.  To
72. See KRIS WERNSTEDT ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DISC. PAPER NO. 98-03,
BASING SUPERFUND CLEANUPS ON FUTURE LAND USES: PROMISING REMEDY OR DUBIOUS
NOSTRUM? (1997).
73. See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and Policy Implications of
Health Risks from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 34, at 55, 78.
An examination of risk pathways determined that existing risks are less salient than future risk
scenarios in assessing human health risks at hazardous waste sites.  See id.
74. Other bills introduced in the 1st session of the 105th Congress include the Common
Sense Superfund Liability Act of 1997 (H.R. 2485), the Superfund Acceleration, Fairness, and
Efficiency Act (H.R. 2727), and the Superfund Reform Act (H.R. 3000).
75. See S.8, 105th Cong. § 501 (1997).
76. See id. § 101.
77. See id. § 402.
78. See id. § 401.
79. All of the major reauthorization bills from the past few years included language that
would require EPA to explicitly account for future land use at a Superfund site when selecting
a remedy.  See, e.g., H.R. 3800, 1st Sess., 103rd Cong. § 503 (1994); H.R. 2500, 2d Sess., 104th
Cong. § 102 (1995); S. 1285, 2d Sess., 104th Cong. § 401 (1995).
80. The guidelines state that “[b]ecause residential land use is most often associated with
the greatest exposures, it is generally the most conservative choice to make when deciding what
type of alternative land use may occur in the future.  Assume future residential land use if it
seems possible based on the evaluation of the available information.” See Hamilton & Viscusi,
supra note 73, at 61.
81. The proposed final listing date for placing the Idaho Pole site on the National Priori-
ties List was June 10, 1986.  See 51 Fed. Reg. 21,054, 21,077 (1986) (to be codified at 400 C.F.R.
pt. 300).
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determine the possible exposure of future residents at this site, EPA
assumed that the site would be used as a mobile home park, an act
requiring the local government to change zoning of the site.  EPA
also assumed that hypothetical residents living in the mobile homes
would not use the city water supply, which was already in place and
currently served the site, but would, instead, drill private wells into
contaminated water at the site.  Finally, EPA assumed that hypo-
thetical future residents at the site would consume 200 grams of con-
taminants every day throughout the year by eating homegrown pro-
duce, in spite of Montana’s ninety-day growing season.82
Legislation that mandates EPA to consider reasonably antici-
pated future land and resource use would lead to more appropriate
remedies and go a long way toward decreasing cleanup costs.83  Leg-
islation for reauthorization and amendment should include provi-
sions to consider future land use when selecting a remedy.  Effec-
tively, this would encourage EPA to reorganize the way the agency
funds remediations, while providing incentives for the Administrator
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis at each Superfund site.  The goal of
this approach is to force EPA to focus on a preference for hot spots
and place containment and long-term reliability on par with treat-
ment and permanence.
C.  Natural Resource Damages
     The Administration supports the legislative proposal on
Natural Resources Damages (NRD) that it drafted and sent to
the House and Senate in October, 1996.  This legislative pro-
posal would clarify that NRD claims would be focused on
restoration costs rather than monetized values and would be
presented in a more timely and orderly fashion, thereby dis-
couraging premature litigation of NRD claims and enhancing
coordination and integration of remedy and restoration.
     The Administration strongly opposes, among other pro-
posals: repeal of all or part of the current liability standards;
proposed caps on recoverable damages; limitations on the
natural resources that can be restored and the scope of trustee-
ship; inappropriate transition rules; or limitations on the type
of values that may be considered in determining the scope or
scale of restoration or damages.
82. See STROUP, supra note 4, at 126-27.
83. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., RCED 96-145, SUPERFUND: IMPLICATIONS OF KEY
REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES 5 (1996) (attesting to EPA’s recognition that not considering rea-
sonable future land use will lead to more costliy cleanups).
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BACKGROUND
Under CERCLA, the parties responsible for the release of haz-
ardous substances are liable for their cleanup as well as “damages for
injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources.”84  Natural re-
sources are defined broadly to include land, fish, wildlife, biota, air,
water, groundwater, drinking water, and other such resources be-
longing to, managed by, or otherwise controlled by federal or other
governmental entities.85  Only natural resource trustees can file natu-
ral resource claims under CERCLA against PRPs.86  A natural re-
source damage claim has three standard components: 1) the cost of
restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the
damaged natural resources; 2) the diminution in value of those natu-
ral resources pending restoration; and 3) the reasonable cost of as-
sessing those damages .87
ANALYSIS
Passed in the wake of widespread public concern over the Exxon
Valdez oil spill, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) made those par-
ties responsible for discharging oil into the nation’s navigable waters
and adjoining shorelines liable for removal costs and damages.88
Consistent with how NRD claims are addressed in OPA and with the
codification of the restoration planning phase for injured natural re-
sources,89 the Administration position for reauthorization and
amendment uses two restoration-based concepts to assess NRD: pri-
mary restoration and compensatory restoration.  Primary restoration
is intended to return the natural resources and services at a site to the
baseline (or natural) level of ecological service that would be present
in the absence of the hazardous spill.90  Compensatory restoration ac-
counts for the lost use (and nonuse) of the natural resources during
the interim period between the spill and the cleanup.91
The federal government has come to rely on the contingent
valuation (CV) method to estimate these use and nonuse values for
84. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
85. See CERCLA § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1994).
86. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.600 (1997).  Natural resources trustees include the Secretaries of
Commerce, Interior, Agriculture, Defense, and Energy.  See id.
87. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (1994).
88. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994)).
89. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (1994).
90. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (1997).
91. See id.
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damaged natural resources.  CV is a controversial tool that employs a
survey to ask people what they would be willing to pay hypothetically
to restore a resource to its pre-damage state or to prevent the dam-
age of a resource.92  CV attempts to create a market where none ex-
isted previously.  An isolated individual, in response to a request to
do so, is presumed to be able to imagine this market, visualize the de-
tails of his and others’ participation in it, and then to state his or her
one-time value for a nonmarketed environmental commodity.  The
Administration’s Superfund proposal continues to support the use of
CV to measure damages in NRD cases, but is currently modeled after
the OPA rule for restoration based natural resource damage assess-
ments.93
Unlike CERCLA, which relies on recovering the monetized
value of lost services for the purpose of restoring, rehabilitating, re-
placing, or acquiring the equivalent of the injured natural resources,94
OPA focuses on recovering those costs necessary to fund restoration
projects.  Lost use values and nonuse values determine the cost of a
restoration project.95  For economists, estimating the interim lost use
value that should be included as the compensatory restoration com-
ponent of a restoration project is a relatively straightforward task
(e.g., out-of-pocket losses suffered by fisherman, recreationists, and
resort owners directly and indirectly harmed by the spill).  OPA
regulations calculate an alternative welfare measure of resource
compensation that follows from the restriction placed on the use of
recoveries.96  The real challenge remains in whether it is possible to
92. See Report of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Panel on Con-
tingent Valuation, 58 Fed. Reg. 4601, 4603 (1993) [hereinafter NOAA Report].
93. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (1997).
94. See CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1994).
95. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(a)(2) (1997) (stipulating that trustees must consider a reason-
able range of restoration alternatives, with each alternative comprised of primary and/or com-
pensatory restoration components).
96. See Carol A. Jones & Katherine A. Pease, Restoration-Based Compensation Measures
in Natural Resource Liability Statutes, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL. 111, 112 (1997).  The re-
source-to-resource or service-to-service scaling approach and the general valuation approach
are outlined in OPA as the two major methods of scaling restoration projects.  See id. at 117.
Scaling a compensatory restoration project adjusts the size of the restoration project to equate
the gains provided by the project with the interim loss incurred due to the incident.  See id.  It is
expected that compensatory restoration projects providing in-kind compensation will expedite
restoration and ensure that enough money is recovered to make the public whole.  For situa-
tions where compensatory restoration projects are not feasible and valuation studies are con-
ducted, the appropriate scale of a restoration project need only be accurate up to the relative
value of the losses.  See id. at 119-20.
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measure accurately the lost nonuse values when scaling a compensa-
tory restoration project.
While the OPA system does not rely as heavily on monetized
damage assessments developed through CV techniques as that found
in CERCLA, the possibility still remains for compensatory restora-
tion projects to generate excessive costs.97  For example, it is feasible
for cost overruns to force the cost of a restoration project to increase
beyond original plans due to contracting problems or other unfore-
seen difficulties during the course of project construction.  While a
compensatory restoration project may begin with the “right” price,
without proper incentives to keep project costs low, compensatory
restoration projects may be no better at preventing excessive com-
pensatory damage payments than currently available CV techniques.
S.8 includes provisions limiting the use of CV to evaluate the ex-
tent of natural resource damages at hazardous waste sites.  Specifi-
cally, S.8 proposes that there shall be no recovery for any impairment
of nonuse values98 implying that any CV assessment of natural re-
source damages must be limited to the measurement of lost use
value.  S.8 further stipulates that trustees could not include the costs
of conducting any type of study relying on the use of CV methodol-
ogy as an assessment cost.99  While this is likely a response to the ris-
ing costs of CV studies, this leaves open the possibility that benefits
transfer100 could be permissible for determining total value for a natu-
ral resource.101
The contingent valuation method remains controversial because it
places a person in a hypothetical market absent arbitrage.  A person is
supposed to be able to understand the good being valued, the market
in which it could be exchanged, how other people might respond to the
market, and have enough confidence to state his value of the good.102
97. It is feasible for the cost of a restoration project to increase beyond original plans due
to contracting problems or other unforeseen difficulties during the course of project construc-
tion.  While a compensatory restoration project may start out at the “right” price, without
proper incentives to keep project costs low, compensatory restoration projects may be no better
at preventing excessive compensatory damage payments than currently available CV tech-
niques.
98. See 1st Sess., 105th Cong. § 701(3)(B)(ii).
99. See id. § 702(a)(C)(iii)(II).
100. Benefits transfer allows non-market valuation of certain goods by using results from
existing CV studies found in the available literature that may or may not be directly related to
the good in question.
101. See generally Glenn W. Harrison & James C. Lesley, Must Contingent Valuation Sur-
veys Cost So Much?, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 79 (1996).
102. See W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, 8
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This raises two critical concerns.  First, does the hypothetical nature of
the good reduce the incentive to take care in assessing the value of
some good, i.e., will people really do what they say they will?  This
potential bias in answering hypothetical questions has been and re-
mains a central question in the continuing debate over the usefulness
of CV to assess the value of nonmarket goods.  Economic values
elicited from hypothetical questions can provide useful information if
the individuals being surveyed respond candidly.  If they do not, re-
sults from CV research may be questionable.  Existing research data
suggest the latter scenario, i.e., hypothetical bids tend to overstate
“real” values obtained in actual markets.103  In an effort to compen-
sate for this uncertainty the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) has recommended that CV surveys be de-
signed to underestimate the willingness to pay to offset exaggerated
responses.104  The effectiveness of this conservative approach will then
be evaluated by judges and juries on a case-by-case basis.105
Recent survey-lab experiments have been designed to measure
and correct for the differences that may exist between what people
say they would do and how they actually behave.  The results from
two recent experiments suggest that the difference between inten-
tions and actions is commodity-specific and context-specific.  Fox et
al.106 observe that the average bids for those who initially favored the
irradiation process needed to be multiplied by factors of 0.7 to 0.9,
while the average bids for those with an initial “distaste” for irradia-
tion needed to be multiplied by factors of 0.6 to 0.7.  List and
Shogren107 also observe that behavioral differences exist in the struc-
ture of the calibration function due to substitution and intensity of
experience.  The average adjustment required in the 1-good auction
                                                                                                                                     
J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 26 (1994).
103. See Richard C. Bishop and Thomas A. Heberlien, Measuring Values of Extramarket
Goods: Are Indirect Measures Biased?, 61 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 926 (1979); Peter Bohm, Esti-
mating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment,  3 EUR. ECON. REV. 111 (1972); Ronald
Cummings et al., Homegrown Values and Hypothetical Surveys: Is the Dichotomous Choice
Approach Incentive Compatible?,  85 AM. ECON. REV. 260 (1995); Mark Dickie et al., Market
Transactions and Hypothetical Demand Data: A Comparative Study,  82 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 69
(1987); Helen R. Neill et al., Hypothetical Surveys and Real Economic Commitments,  70 LAND
ECON. 145 (1994); Kalle Seip & Jon Strand, Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods in
Norway: A Contingent Valuation Study with Real Payment,  2 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 91 (1992).
104. See NOAA Report, supra note 92, at 4608.
105. See id. at 4611.
106. See John Fox et al., CVM-X: Calibrating Contingent Values with Experimental Auction
Markets,  AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. (forthcoming) [on file with authors].
107. J. List & J. Shogren, Calibrating Actual and Hypothetical Bids from a Field Experi-
ment,  J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. (forthcoming) [on file with authors].
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(0.4) was less severe than for the 10-good auction that contained sub-
stitutes (0.3).108  Furthermore, weak evidence suggests that intensity
of experience affects calibration as well, as the hypothetical bids of
sportscard dealers had to be adjusted by 0.46, less stringent than non-
dealers and not significantly different from NOAA’s 50% default.109
The results suggest that unconditional use of a uniform calibration
factor is unjustified at this time, and that research needs to proceed
on a case-by-case basis until there is enough evidence to reveal any
systematic bias to accept or reject the notion of a general calibration
function.
The second critical question asks: does the lack of arbitrage affect
the values revealed by a person?  The foundation of the economic the-
ory of choice lies in the expression of values through repeated give and
take with others in an exchange institution.  The institution defines in-
centives and articulates knowledge and beliefs about relevant laws of
nature and of humans.  It relates a person’s choice to the choices of
others and to the consequences these aggregated choices produce.  The
exchange institution is therefore a collective habit.  When it is absent a
person must draw more intensely upon his or her personal resources.
Arbitrage within a market is the give and take of exchange that pro-
vides the incentive to behave rationally. And though the verdict is still
out, enough empirical evidence exists to fuel skeptics who wonder
whether asking an isolated person to visualize hypothetical participa-
tion in a new market is sufficient to cause him to behave for one time in
accordance with the standard assumptions underlying economic theory,
i.e., the maximization of expected welfare.  A researcher’s polite re-
quest to imagine a nonexistent market does not obviously cause the ra-
tionality of the real market to rub off on a respondent.
Since exchange institutions usually do not exist for natural re-
source services, a person can act as if his stated values will go uncon-
tested; he is asocial, unaccountable to others, and unless one is willing
to presume a person is a complete image of a nonstrategic, anonymous,
competitive market,  the person may lack the incentives to act as if he
is following any notion of economic theory of choice.  Abundant eco-
nomic and psychological evidence suggests that without arbitrage peo-
ple often fall short of predictable behavior presumed in the standard
economic theory of choice.110
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See generally RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE (1992).
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Because markets do not exist for most environmental assets, un-
predictable behavior exercises great influence over the allocation of
these assets and thus influences the values derived from their presence
and use. Crocker et al.111 posit that a Coasean corollary exists for non-
market valuation.  When information processing costs are zero, the re-
searcher can provide enough information such that stated values would
be identical to the market price, if it existed.  But if information costs
were non-existent, people would generate their own information that
would match up with what a researcher could provide.  Elaborate in-
formation packages in survey research would be redundant, as respon-
dents would select the same information themselves.  But since infor-
mation costs are not zero, the fact that most researchers have not
included arbitrage in a market will affect stated values.  Therefore, it is
important to use some notion of arbitrage in contingent valuation so
that a person can consider the private consequences of his stated val-
ues.
The hypothetical nature and the absence of arbitrage causes us to
argue that caution must be maintained with the trustee’s use of CV to
scale restoration projects for NRD claims.  Because no effective
theoretical bound exists on the limits of nonuse value, CV studies can
be constructed that measure nonuse value at implausible high levels.
No clear consensus exists in the academic literature about the correct
answers to these two critical questions.  And while the opposition of
big industry and insurance companies toward CV and NRD has been
submerged over the last few years as it has become clearer that few
big-ticket judgments are being awarded, researchers still have to ad-
dress whether hypothetical, non-arbitraged value estimates should be
used on cost-benefit balance sheets.
D.  Brownfields and Voluntary Cleanup Programs
Support expansion of the current Brownfields program, including
funding for site identification and assessment, funding to capitalize re-
volving loan funds for brownfield site cleanups, technical support and
funding for job training and workforce development, and provisions
for bona fide prospective purchasers.
111. See T. Crocker et al., Incomplete Beliefs and Nonmarket Valuation, RES. & ENERGY
ECON. (forthcoming) [on file with authors].
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Support the development, enhancement and expansion of State
voluntary cleanup programs that meet appropriate standards as stated
above.
The Administration strongly opposes provisions, among other
proposals, which limit current brownfields grant eligibility and flexi-
bility.  The Administration also strongly opposes provisions including
the following: restrictions on federal ability to adequately protect hu-
man health, welfare and the environment, particularly at higher risk
sites, under State voluntary cleanup programs, and other limitations
such as any limits on the authority to act upon a determination of im-
minent and substantial endangerment to human health, welfare or the
environment.
BACKGROUND
Current brownfield redevelopment principles are contributing to
the call for CERCLA reform.  Brownfields are typically urban prop-
erties located in industrial or commercial areas where redevelopment
is hampered by real or perceived environmental pollution.112  Because
CERCLA’s liability laws can include virtually any party associated
with ownership or operation at a potentially contaminated site,113
many brownfield sites are not recycled and lay abandoned as firms
locate and build in less risky suburban “greenfields.”114  As a result,
greenfield developments will both impose a significant burden on ur-
ban districts seeking renewal and contribute to exacerbating urban
sprawl.
Most brownfields are not likely to be added to the NPL because
they are not severely contaminated.  The extent of the brownfields
problem is still unknown, since there is no official count of brown-
fields in the United States.115  In the midst of this uncertainty, devel-
opers remain wary of the cleanup liability provisions of both federal
and state legislation because they can apply to all sites, including
brownfields.  Former property owners may also be liable for cleanup
costs if the contamination occurred while they owned the properties.
Thus, even the suspicion of current or prior contamination may make
112. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 32, at 3.
113. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
114. “Greenfields” are uncontaminated sites typically located outside city limits and have
no hazardous waste liability risk associated with their development.
115. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 32, at 4.  The Urban Land Institute estimated
that about 150,000 acres of abandoned or underused industrial land exist in major U.S. cities.
This estimate is believed to be at the lower end of a range of estimates.  Id.
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developers hesitant to purchase brownfield properties and owners
reluctant to place their properties on the market.
Due to the costs associated with responsibility for cleaning up a
brownfield site,116 developers and industries choose to avoid the po-
tential liability problems associated with a contaminated site.  To
avoid these potential liability problems, industries will locate on un-
contaminated sites rather than on brownfields.  While these
“greenfields” may require building additional infrastructure that
brownfield sites would not need,117 developers may still view green-
fields as a more cost-effective solution to growth than brownfield
cleanup.  With new housing developments and industrial centers
reaching farther into environmentally sensitive lands and increasing
the dependence on automobiles while isolating central cities and
older communities, public costs associated with urban sprawl have
become substantial.118  Serious environmental impacts and congestion
are common by-products of urban sprawl as developers are forced to
build adequate systems of roads and sewer, water, and electric lines
to meet residential, commercial, and industrial development needs.
As more greenfields are developed,119 city governments lose tax reve-
nues as industry relocates to the suburbs and the problem of urban
sprawl worsens.
ANALYSIS
Congress has considered actions to help address some of the
problems associated with brownfields.  The Asset Conservation,
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996,120
provides liability relief for lenders that foreclose on contaminated
properties.  Just as S.8 was the most prominent of the Superfund
amendment and reauthorization bills introduced in the first session of
the 105th Congress, the Brownfields and Environmental Cleanup Act
of 1997, S.18, was the preeminent brownfields bill introduced in 1997.
S.18 offers to promote the economic redevelopment of brownfield
sites and stimulate the assessment and cleanup of these sites.  S.8 and
S.18 address Superfund liability issues at brownfields by limiting the
liability of prospective purchasers and clarifying circumstances under
116. These costs include litigation fees.
117. Infrastructure such as access roads and sewer systems are typically included in brown-
field sites.
118. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 25TH ANNIVERSARY
REPORT, 173-74 (1995).
119. See id. at 171.
120. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997).
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which current landowners would not be liable for past contamination.
Further, based on the number of brownfields bills introduced in the
first session of the 105th Congress in both the House and the Sen-
ate,121 there seems to be bipartisan support for providing tax incen-
tives for brownfield development.122
Creating tax incentives and providing liability relief for brown-
fields development is a step towards generating increased efficiency
in the Superfund program.  These activites would likely provide de-
velopers with the proper incentives to increase redevelopment of
brownfields, increase tax revenues for cities and slow urban sprawl by
reducing the incentives to develop greenfields.
III.  CONCLUSION
The objective of Superfund is laudable—cleaning up the most
polluted inactive waste sites in the United States.  But thus far Super-
fund in practice has created too many inefficiencies.  Several reform
deals were almost closed at several junctures during the first Clinton
administration but ultimately fell through.  Instead, the EPA set in
motion a set of administrative reforms that attempt to address many
of the issues of concern.  And while the EPA’s efforts should not be
underestimated, there will always be question marks due to problems
of measurability.  Major legislative reform remains a worthwhile ob-
jective.
The Clinton administration’s recent reform principles are sup-
posed to move Superfund in a direction that is “faster, fairer, and
more efficient.”  But these principles fall short and more fundamen-
tal changes are needed to achieve the administration’s goal of “faster,
fairer, and more efficient” cleanups.  Changes to the underlying li-
ability structure remain the most effective approach to removing the
inefficiency.  Major reform will require the codification of a method
reducing the number of parties subject to joint and several liability
since this rule currently creates excessive litigation among private
parties.  “Polluter pays” should be based on actions, not status.  Fur-
ther, retroactive liability should be eliminated in favor of a system
that funds the cleanup of existing hazardous waste sites through a
targeted corporate environmental tax.  Although this scheme would
121. A partial list of the legislation introduced in the first session of the 105th Congress in-
cludes H.R.1049, S.18, H.R.1395, H.R.1120, and S.23.
122. See, e.g., Brownfields Bipartisan Bill Would Give Tax Break for Parties Cleaning Up
Brownfields, HAZ. WASTE NEWS, Feb. 10, 1997, at 1; Bipartisan Team Introduces a New House
Superfund Reform Bill, FED. & STATE INS. WEEK, Nov. 17, 1997, at 1.
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be less harsh in punishing polluters of existing hazardous waste sites,
efficiency gains can be achieved  and transaction costs can be re-
duced.
One approach to reduce the number of firms subject to the li-
ability  rules is to preempt liability through alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) techniques.  ADR can play a more predominant role in
settling Superfund disputes by getting firms out of the liability quag-
mire.  Therefore, a priority should be to understand the workings of
different ADR methods.  If the efficiency gains generated by ADR at
the local level are substantial, more and more firms will demand their
use in Superfund disputes.  Providing more attention to ADR tech-
niques like the EPA’s  allocation pilot method and the allocation of
orphan share funding by the federal government can go a long way
toward decreasing transaction costs and generating efficient settle-
ments in the Superfund program.
More emphasis also needs to be placed on the role of reasonably
anticipated future land use in remedy selection.  Mandating EPA to
focus on hot spots and addressing containment and long-term reli-
ability as equal with treatment and permanence can generate effi-
ciency gains and lower cleanup costs significantly.  The use of contin-
gent valuation surveys to estimate the value of lost resources in
compensatory restoration projects remains worrisome, despite less
insurance company opposition to NRD in recent years.  Until hypo-
thetical surveys can be shown to be reliable on a consistent basis, the
possibility remains for an implausibly high damage assessment to be
levied in an NRD case.
The administration’s reform principles represent motion towards
a more efficient CERCLA program.  But almost any movement away
from the current system will generate efficiency gains.  Instead, the
administration should focus on achieving the most efficiency in the
operation of the Superfund program while maintaining public safety.
The principles are aimed at minor modification of the key issues of
CERCLA that demand a major overhaul.  Until these principles ad-
dress the likely behavioral responses of affected parties, valuable re-
sources will be wasted with no appreciable gain in environmental
quality.
